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Abstract 
In 2001, the Swedish system of student aid for college students was substantially re-
formed; the grant-share of the total aid was increased, students were allowed to earn 
more without a reduction in student aid, and the repayment schedule of the loans was 
significantly tightened. In this paper, we examine the effects of the reform on individual 
study efficiency, measured as the number of credit points achieved each semester. We 
use all program students with a first registration at a Swedish college between 1995 and 
2001(before the reform) and estimate a linear regression model including individual 
fixed effects. There is a slightly positive and significant effect of the reform on the ag-
gregate level. However, dividing the sample conditionally on the parental educational 
level reveals that the individual study efficiency has increased only for students from a 
strong academic background. In other words, the relative study efficiency has decreased 
for students from a weak academic background. The different results between students 
from different parental backgrounds appear to be related to the reallocation of time be-
tween work and studies.  
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1  Introduction 
Most OECD countries provide financial aid for college students, with the common goal 
to increase college attendance and completion (OECD 2008). The Swedish system of 
student aid consists of two parts: loans and grants. All students admitted to higher edu-
cation are eligible for student aid independent of their parental background.  
In 2001, the Swedish system of student aid went through its greatest reform since its 
inception.
1
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the student aid reform on indi-
vidual study efficiency, measured as the number of credit points achieved each seme-
ster. Hence, we study only individuals that are already enrolled at a university at the 
time of the reform. The number of credit points achieved each semester is closely re-
lated to the time-to-graduation, that is, the number of semesters required to reach a giv-
en number of credit points.  
 In short, the government increased the share of grants, allowed students to 
earn considerably more income while in college without a reduction in student aid and 
significantly tightened the rules for repayment of the loans. However, the total amount 
of student aid was unchanged. The overall objective of the reform was to create a self-
supporting system by requiring all students, to the greatest possible degree and accord-
ing to government proposition (prop. 1999/2000:10), to repay their loans. The intention 
was also that the reform would reduce the individual cost of college attendance by re-
ducing the amount of the loans.   
Increased graduation rates and the speed at which individuals obtain higher education 
degrees are declared social objectives in many countries. Brunello et al. (2004) study 
the expected time-to-graduation in ten European countries and find that the proportion 
of students who expect to graduate at least one year later than the specified time ranges 
from above 30 percent in Sweden and Italy to almost zero in the UK and Ireland.
2
                                                 
1 See National Board of Student Aid (CSN, 2007). 
 Ex-
tending time-to-graduation provides private monetary costs to individuals by shortening 
their careers after graduation. Further, Brodaty et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
French individuals with longer than average time-to-graduation have significantly lower 
2 Brunello et al.  examine only Economics and Business students.  4   
wages and employment rates in their early careers, and Holmlund et al. (2008) show 
that working experience post-college graduation is more valuable than working expe-
rience pre-college graduation. Häkkinen (2006) finds no significant effects on future 
employment or earnings of working while in college. Moreover, increased study dura-
tion creates considerable social costs by reducing labor supply and increasing depen-
dency ratios.   
Theoretically, the expected effects of the reform are not clear.
3
There are only two (unpublished) studies that examine the effect of student aid on 
individual study efficiency/duration. Häkkinen and Uusitalo (2003) evaluate the time-
to-graduation for Finnish college students during the 1990s. Specifically, they evaluate 
the effect of a student aid reform that was intended to shorten the duration of university 
studies.
 An increase in the 
grant level will tend to lower the relative cost of college education compared to being in 
the labor market and hence, increase the time-to-graduation. However, an increase in 
the grant level may decrease the time-to-graduation as it allows students to focus on 
their studies rather than on work. The tighter repayment schedule of the student loans 
should encourage students to minimize the amount of their loans by decreasing the 
time-to-graduation; however, it may increase the time-to-graduation if students choose 
not to take loans and work instead. Correspondingly, the increased possibilities of work 
during college may increase the time-to-graduation if students allocate more time to 
work and thereby less time to their studies. 
4 Nielsen Ardent (2008) evaluates a Danish reform and examines how financial 
aid affects drop-outs from and completion of higher education.
5 These studies find only 
a modest or no effect of the studied reforms. A related, and relatively rich, literature ex-
amines the effect of tuition fees and student aid on the enrollment decision.
6
                                                 
3 See e.g., Becker (1993), Cameron and Taber (2000), Card (1999), Bettinger (2004), Eckstein and Wop-
lin (1999), and Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987). See Nielsen Arendt (2008) for a summary of the theoreti-
cal framework.  
 
4 The Finnish reform incorporated a change from a loan-based to a grant-based financial system.  
5 The Danish reform incorporated a substantial increase in the grant-level.  
6 For studies on tuition levels and enrollment decisions, see e.g. Manski and Wise (1983), McPherson and 
Schapio (1991 a,b), Kane (1994), Rouse (1994), Hoenack (1971), Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984), and 
Moore et al. (1991). For studies on student aid and enrollment decisions, see e.g. SchrøterJoensen (2009), 
Skyt Nielsen et al. (2008),Baumgartner and Steiner (2006), Linsenmeier et. al. (2006), Dynarski (2002, 
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To examine the effect of the reform on individual study efficiency, we follow stu-
dents from enrollment until they achieve a degree or an equivalent number of credit 
points, and we examine the number of credit points earned each semester. We consider 
all students who enrolled in a program between 1995 and spring of 2001(i.e., before the 
reform). Hence, we include only students that are within a study spell at the time of the 
reform, and we estimate a linear regression model. We choose this approach, rather than 
using a duration model and estimate the time to degree, as it allows us to include indi-
vidual fixed effects.
7
The different results for individuals from a strong and a weak academic background, 
respectively, seem to be related to differences in how they allocate their time between 
studying and working. Individuals from strong academic backgrounds earn substantially 
less after the reform compared to before, while students from weak academic back-
grounds earn slightly more after the reform compared to before. One interpretation is 
that students want to minimize the amount of loans as a consequence of the reform, and 
they do so by reallocating time from work to studies so as to reach a degree sooner. 
However, students from weak academic backgrounds are possibly more dependent on 
financing their studies by work and therefore may not have this option; they rather in-
crease their earnings.  
 Furthermore, we estimate relative reform effects for individuals 
with different parental backgrounds. We find a slightly positive and significant effect of 
the reform on the aggregate level. However, dividing the sample conditionally on the 
parental educational level reveals that the individual study efficiency has increased only 
for those students from a strong academic background. Consequently, the relative study 
efficiency decreased for students from a weak academic background.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the Swe-
dish university system and the financial aid for college studies in Sweden. In section 
three, our empirical strategy is presented, and in section four, we describe the data ana-
                                                                                                                                               
2003), Van der Klaauw (2002), Reuterberg and Svensson (1999), Fredriksson (1997), Hammarström 
(1996). 
 
7Moreover, it creates fewer problems with endogenity with time-variant covariates. See Häkkinen and 
Uusitalo (2003) for a discussion.  6   
lyzed. Section five presents the empirical results, and finally, in section six, some con-
cluding remarks are offered.  
2  The Swedish University System 
The number of full-time equivalent university students has increased dramatically from 
approximately 161,000 in 1991 to approximately 304,000 in 2009, and the number of 
universities and colleges has increased from 5 universities in 1965 to approximately 25 
universities and colleges that provide education within most fields today.
8,9
The system of higher education is financed and regulated by the Swedish Parliament 
and Government.
 A political 
goal is that 50 percent of a birth cohort should be enrolled in higher education before the 
age of 25.  
10 Since 1977, a single administrative authority on the national level 
handles the admissions for all colleges.
11 Because the number of applicants is often 
higher than the number of educational slots, generally, grades from upper secondary 
schooling determine admission.
12
The graduation requirement up to the year 2007 was, generally, a minimum of 120 
acquired credit points.
 
13 One credit point corresponded to approximately one week of 
full-time study, and 120 credits corresponded to three years of full-time studies (a ba-
chelor’s degree). In general, students can be divided into two groups: the program stu-
dents and the course students.
14
                                                 
8National agency for higher education (2001, 2010). There are also a number of specialized colleges. 
 Program students enter a program usually lasting three 
or more years, whereas course students register for separate courses that typically last 
one semester. However, separate courses may be combined to correspond to a program.  
9 The terms university, university college and college are used interchangeably throughout the paper.  
10 See National Agency for Higher Education (2004, 2006, 2007) for details on higher education in Swe-
den.  
11 Initially, they handled applications to programs and all courses. Later, they handled admissions mainly 
to programs and to most universities. Since 2007, they again handle applications to programs and most 
courses.  
12 There is also an aptitude test, and previous work experience may be taken into account.  
13 However, since 2007, as a result of the Bologna process, one credit point in the old system corresponds 
to 1.5 points in the new system.  
14 National Agency for Higher Education (2005).   7 
2.1  Financial Aid for College Students in Sweden 
There are no tuitions fees at Swedish universities, and the government offers universal 
financial support for all students. The financial support consists  of  both  loans  and 
grants. All students admitted to higher education are eligible for financial support inde-
pendent of their parental background. The overall political motive for the financial aid 
system in Sweden is that it should promote high participation in education, and an im-
portant political intention of the student aid is to reduce the social stratification of high-
er education (prop. 1999/2000:10).  
Since the introduction of the student aid system in 1965, there have been several re-
forms of the system. The reform implemented in the fall of 2001 is considered to be the 
largest reform since the introduction of the system (CSN 2007). The total amount of fi-
nancial aid,  of approximately 700 EUR/month,  was unaffected in the 2001 reform. 
However, after the 2001 reform i) the share of the grant increased to 34.5 percent of the 
total amount  compared  to 27.8 percent in the earlier system, which means that the 
grants increase by approximately 600 SEK (60 EUR) per month; ii) students are al-
lowed to earn 91,000 SEK per year while still receiving full student support, which is 67 
percent more than in the former system (one motive for this change was to make it poss-
ible for students to gain (useful) work experience and improve their standard of living 
while studying); and iii) the repayment scheme for study loans is notably less generous 
than that in the former system. In the earlier system, students started to repay their loans 
six months after they received their last payment from the system. They paid 4 percent 
of their annual earnings and when they turned 65 all remaining debt was written off. In 
the new system, the monthly repayment is calculated as an annuity such that the total 
debt should be repaid in 25 years.
15
Further, after the reform in 2001, the maximum number of years for student aid was 
unchanged with a maximum of six years for student aid; however, following the reform, 
the possibility of being granted an extension is considerably less. The maximum age of 
 The changes of the repayment should thus make it 
significantly less attractive to take out study loans. 
                                                 
15If the loan is not repaid by the age of 60, individuals continue to pay until the age of 67. Individuals re-
pay a maximum of 5 percent of their annual earnings. However, from the age of 50, the maximum is 7 
percent of their annual earnings. The debt is written off at the age of 67. 8   
eligibility for a student loan after 2001 is 50 years of age compared to 45 years of age 
before the reform. After the reform, students with children became eligible for higher 
student loans than students without children.  
The new system covers all students who began studying in the fall of 2001 as well as 
those who were already enrolled in college at the time.  
3  Empirical Strategy 
We include only students i) with a registration in a program with a theoretical length of 
at least 120 credit points (corresponding to a bachelors degree), ii) who enrolled at a 
program before the reform, and iii) who have not achieved 120 credit points before the 
reform. We follow the students until they reach 120 credit points or the maximum of 12 
semesters. In general, 12 semesters is the upper bound for student aid, that is, the maxi-
mum number of semesters students can receive student aid. The rationale behind these 
restrictions is that we want to be reasonably sure we include only students who are with-
in a study spell at the time of the reform.  
We estimate the linear regression model such that 
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where lnCPis is the logarithm of credit points achieved in semester s for individual i; r is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 after the reform and 0 before; β1 is the reform effect; i γ
is an individual time-invariant component, such as individual ability; and  is ε is an indi-
vidual time-varying component.   
Because the reform was introduced at a particular point in time, any efficiency effect 
from the progression of studies due, for example, to experience, will be correlated with 
the reform and thus may confound the reform effect. We control for that individuals are 
at a later stage in their study spell after the reform compared to before (study progres-
sion) by including dummy variables for each semester since program entry (s). Moreo-  9 
ver, we include a dummy variable indicating the fall semester (Fall).
16 However, indi-
viduals who have been enrolled for the same number of semesters may be at different 
points in their study spell in terms of the total credit points achieved. Therefore, we in-
clude a continuous variable for total credit points attained (cum_p) up to each s. To con-
sider that the link between total credit points achieved up to semester s and credit points 
achieved in semester s may be non-linear, we also include a quadratic term (cum_p
2).
17
To capture that the composition of students may change over time due to, for exam-
ple, anticipation effects, we include dummy variables for each college entry cohort (C). 
This will control for all cohort specific factors that are constant across time. Moreover, 
this is a crucial control as our set up impose that students in earlier cohorts are different 
in terms of study efficiency compared to those in later cohorts. Furthermore, students 
are only included if they have not reached a degree or its equivalent before the reform. 
However, observing some students before the reform and some students after the reform 
during the same duration of study is what makes our approach viable.  
 
Further, we include some time-constant control variables (Xi). Variables included are 
country of birth, gender, age at college entry, parental educational level and grades from 
high school (GPA). We also include a few time-varying variables (Xis) such as field of 
education, student status with respect to parent/non-parent and local youth unemploy-
ment rates (yearly).
18
                                                 
16Because the reform was introduced in the fall of 2001 and students acquire about 60 percent of their an-
nual credit points during the spring semester, this is an important control.  
 We include local unemployment rates to control for the labor 
market opportunities at each college location (county). The reason to include these con-
trol variables is that we want to estimate the study efficiency holding these factors con-
stant. For example, if the reform affects the student’s choice of study program (field of 
education) and if different study programs are linked to individual study efficiency, the 
reform coefficient will capture this effect. Our objective is to estimate the study effi-
17 We have elaborated with dummy variables and found a non-linear decreasing trend that fits well with 
our specification. The results are robust for including a number of dummy variables as an alternative to 
our current specification. The results are presented in section 5.4 (the sensitivity analysis section).  
18 We use the definition used by the Swedish employment services. Youth unemployment is defined as 
unemployment rates for individuals 18-24 years of age. We choose this definition as most students are 
under the age of 24 at enrollment. See Figure A1 in the Appendix.  10   
ciency given the study program. However, as we will see, the observable covariates do 
not significantly influence the estimated reform effect.  
The panel dimension of our data further allows us to include individual fixed effects, 
that is, to control for all time-invariant individual specific factors. Hence, we estimate 
the following:  
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where∆indicates deviations from individual means. Note that in the case of dummy va-
riables,∆indicates a change from 0 to 1. Ci, Xi and γi in equation (3.1) are eliminated, as 
they are constant within the individual. The average treatment effect, β1, is identified if 
the transformed model residual is uncorrelated with the reform dummy. If there are time 
trends in study efficiency for which we have not controlled in the model, the average 
treatment effect will be biased. Though we believe that our cohort fixed effects (in-
cluded in the individual fixed effects) and local unemployment rates capture most rele-
vant time trends, we introduce an additional source of variation by including interaction 
variables between the parental educational level and the reform (rParent). β8 is the rela-
tive reform effect. β8 is identified under the relatively weaker assumption that students 
from different parental backgrounds are affected similarly by any time trends, the paral-
lel trends assumption. 
From previous literature, we expect students from a weak academic background to be 
more responsive to changes in the student aid system. Hammarström (1996) has investi-
gated why high school graduates in Sweden do not enroll in higher education. Her re-
sults suggest that individuals from a weak academic background are more dependent on 
financial aid when deciding whether to pursue higher education. Moreover, a survey 
administered to students with student aid in 2001 and 2003 reveals that approximately 
60 percent of all students would “probably not” or “would not” have enrolled in higher 
education if there were no student aid.
19
                                                 
19CSN (2007). 
 For students who have parents with less than a   11 
post-secondary education, that number was 72 percent, and for student with parents 
with at most a post-secondary education, the share was 64 percent. For students with 
highly educated parents, the share was only 42 percent. To summarize, students from a 
strong academic background appear to be less dependent on the student aid system.  
4  Data 
The data used are provided by the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation 
(IFAU). The original data sources are Statistics Sweden and the National Board for 
Higher Education. The data consist of a number of merged administrative records. The 
main registers used are the college registration registers that contain information such as 
field of study and level of education, a longitudinal income register (LOUISE) that 
gathers information on demographics and socioeconomic factors, and the employment 
register (RAMS) that contains information about earnings. The data cover the entire 
Swedish population aged 16 to 74 and is available up to 2007, at the time of this study. 
4.1  The sample   
Our original sample, including all students with a first registration at a university be-
tween the fall of 1995 and the spring of 2001, consists of approximately 368,000 stu-
dents. By including only program students, we exclude approximately 110,000 individ-
uals, and by excluding students who have attained at least 120 credit points (corres-
ponding to a bachelors degree) before the reform we lose an additional 84,000. By im-
posing an age restriction and including only individuals who are under the age of 41 at 
the time of enrollment, we exclude another 4,000 individuals. The reason for imposing 
this age restriction is that the eligibility of student aid is reduced for each year after the 
individual has turned 41. Moreover, we exclude individuals who have missing informa-
tion in any population register (5,000 observations). These are most likely to be non-
Swedish citizens and/or exchange students. We then exclude 28,000 individuals because 
there is no available information about their high school GPA. Grades from high school 
are only available for individuals who graduated from high school in 1985 or later. Ap-
proximately 11,000 individuals are excluded because they have missing parental infor-
mation on one or both parents. The reason for excluding these individuals is that the 12   
causes of the missing parental data are unknown and, thus, probably differ for different 
individuals within the group and, as such, it is not a homogenous group. Finally, we ex-
clude another 4,000 individuals who have missing information in the field of education.  
After applying the above restrictions, we have approximately 122,000 individuals in 
our sample. We perform some sensitivity analyses to the above restrictions in Section 
5.4.   
4.2  The variables
20
The data contain information about both registered credit points and completed credit 
points by semester. We observe the number of academic credit points completed each 
semester. The number of registered credit points only indicates the number of credit 
points an individual signed up for; it reveals no information about whether the individu-
al actually attended or participated in the course.  
 
In 1996, the grading in high school changed. Until 1996, the grading scale ranged 
from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest. From 1997 on, the grading con-
sists of a four-degree scale of 0 to 20 (0, 10, 15, and 20). We have converted all grades 
into the new grading system, where 0 is the lowest grade and 20 the highest.
21
The field of education is defined as the registered field each semester. If the individ-
ual has several registered fields of education for the same semester, we use the field in 
which the individual achieved the most number of credit points. If the student does not 
achieve any credit points in a given semester, the field of education is the same as the 
registered field of education the previous semester. Hence, individuals change field of 
education when a new field is registered. If the individual does not have a known field 
of education the first semester, we use the registered field the following semester. This 
accounts for approximately 20 percent of the sample.   
 
Incomes are available on a yearly basis. We have information about student earnings, 
capital incomes, unemployment benefits, sickness insurance and student aid. We cannot 
distinguish between student loans and grants; we can only observe the total amount of 
student aid. However, if we assume that individuals who have loans normally also have 
                                                 
20 See Appendix Table A1 and A2 for a detailed description of the variables used.  
21 After performing this conversion, we do not find any discontinuities in the distribution of the GPA or 
any other objects in our data that might be related to the different grading system.   13 
grants, we may also assume that students who have a total amount of student aid that is 
equal to or less than the maximum grant, do not have any (or very small) loans. This is a 
reasonable assumption as students eligible for loans are also eligible for grants. Still, 
students may, in theory, choose not to take grants (e.g., principled reasons). In practice, 
this is not very likely.   
Further, we have information about the parental educational level. This is used to de-
duce whether the student may be classified as having a weak or a strong academic 
background. We divide students into three categories depending on their parental educa-
tional level: i) both parents have a post-high school education (BOTH), ii) only one par-
ent has a post-high school education (ONE),  and iii) neither parent has a post-high 
school education (NONE). We will focus on the groups NONE and BOTH; however, 
the results for ONE are also presented throughout. If the parental educational level 
changes during the time period, we use the highest educational level attained.  
5  Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results from our analysis. First, we present the results on 
an aggregate level including interaction variables between the reform and the parental 
educational level; that is, we estimate the relative reform effects. Second, we conduct 
separate analyses on students with different pre-reform amounts of student aid and labor 
market earnings. Finally, we perform robustness checks to confirm that our model and 
results are stable with respect to the choice of sampling and functional form.  
 
5.1  Main Results 
Table 1 presents our main results. We have estimated our model by i) successively in-
cluding different covariates, ii) including individual fixed effects, and iii) including inte-
raction variables between the parental educational level and the reform.   
First, we only include the reform dummy variable, that is, a dummy variable indicat-
ing the post reform period. Including only the reform dummy variable results in a nega-
tive coefficient; thus, the number of achieved credit points each semester is, on average, 
lower after the reform than before the reform.  14   
Next, we control for study progression by i) including dummy variables for each 
semester of enrollment (Specification 2) together with  an indicator for whether the 
semester is spring or fall and ii) including the total credit points achieved up to each 
semester (Specification 3).  Including control variables for study progression changes 
the sign of the estimated coefficient of the reform. Hence, the negative estimate in Spe-
cification 1 appears to be driven by the fact that students are at a different stage in their 
study spell before the reform compared to after the reform. This is expected, as we have 
a strong correlation between the reform dummy variable and the study progression va-
riables; semesters later in the individual study spell will occur after the introduction of 
the reform. Likewise, students with more accumulated credit points are concentrated in 
the years after the reform. The coefficients on the semester specific indicators are more 
negative for later semesters; for example, the probability of being a college drop-out is 
higher. This tends to bias the reform effect parameter downwards. However, the posi-
tive linear term on the cumulative credit points indicates that students are more produc-
tive when they are at a later stage of their study spell, perhaps due to experience, which 
tends to bias the reform parameter upwards.    
In Specification 4, we include cohort fixed effects. The cohort fixed effects will cap-
ture all time-invariant factors that are cohort specific. This is a crucial control because it 
will capture that the study efficiency, on average, by definition in our set up, is lower 
for earlier entry cohorts. Including the cohort fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on 
the reform dummy is still positive and significant, though much smaller in magnitude. 
Further, in Specification 5, we add a number of control variables, such as field of educa-
tion, gender, country of birth, age at program entry, GPA from high school, student sta-
tus as parent/non-parent, local unemployment rates and parental educational level. To 
include these observable covariates does not have much effect on the estimated reform 
effect, but all of the variables have a significant effect on credit points achieved each 
semester. For example, women appear to be slightly less effective in producing academ-
ic credit points compared to men, while immigrants are considerably more efficient than 
natives. Furthermore, students with a higher age at enrollment and students with child-
ren seem to be less efficient, while students with a higher GPA and a higher parental 
educational level are more efficient. The local unemployment rate is positively corre-  15 
lated with individual efficiency; one explanation may be that the possibility of work is 
more limited during high unemployment periods and thus, students focus more on their 
studies.  
In Specification 6, we include individual fixed effects (FE) to control for additional 
time-invariant individual heterogeneity possibly not captured by our observable control 
variables. Including individual FE, the magnitude of the estimated reform effect is re-
duced. Hence, our FE captures some individual specific (time-invariant) factors that 
have not been controlled for by including observable control variables. Therefore, we 
include individual FE from here on.     
To examine the relative reform effects for individuals with a strong and weak aca-
demic background, we include interaction variables between the parental educational 
level and the reform (Specification 7). The estimated reform effect is significant and 
slightly negative for students from a weak academic background, whereas the reform ef-
fect for individuals from a strong academic background is highly significant and has a 
positive magnitude of more than ten percent.
22
In Section 
 Thus, while students from a weak aca-
demic background seem to be rather unaffected by the reform, students from a strong 
academic background have a considerably higher efficiency after the reform compared 
to before. Hence, the time-to-degree is shorter. To put the estimated effects into context, 
ten percent corresponds to two credit points for full-time students; over the course of six 
semesters (the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree for a full-time student), this corres-
ponds to twelve credit points, which is more than half a semester. 
3, we posed the hypothesis that students from a strong academic back-
ground are less dependent on the student aid system and therefore less sensitive to 
changes in the system. However, our results indicate that mainly students from a strong 
academic background are affected by the reform. However, if students from a strong 
academic background have better knowledge and information about the student aid sys-
tem, they could potentially be more sensitive to changes in the system. An alternative 
explanation for this result, based on theory, is that students may react to the reform by 
                                                 
22 We also excluded the time-varying variables field of education and having children from this specification, because 
these variables possibly are endogenous to the reform. However, the estimated reform effects were not affected. 
Hence, to include these variables does not affect the results. See section 3 for a more detailed discussion.  16   
minimizing the amount of loans by reallocating time from work to studies so as to soon-
er attain a degree, while students from a weak academic background may not have the 
option to reallocate time from work to studies, plausibly being more dependent on fi-
nancing their studies by work. Yet another explanation, which fits with the hypothesis 
posited in Section 3, is that the estimated reform effect for students from a strong aca-
demic background captures some time trend in study efficiency, while students from a 
weak academic background would have had the same time trend in absence of the 
reform. Hence, their study efficiency has decreased relative to students from a strong 
academic background. Alternatively, students with different academic backgrounds 
simply may have different time trends. In the next section, we will further discuss and 
test the hypotheses presented here. 
Finally, in Specification 8, we include a dummy variable that controls for semesters 
with zero credit points achieved (intermissions or drop-out). The estimated reform effect 
is now interpreted as the effect for active students, that is, for students who have ob-
tained at least some credit points. For students from a weak academic background, the 
estimated reform effect becomes more negative, including a variable that controls for 
semesters with zero credit points. For students from a strong academic background, the 
estimated reform effect changes sign and is now slightly negative, though not as nega-
tive as for students from a weak academic background. Hence, the positive reform ef-
fect for students from a strong academic background is completely driven by their in-
termission and dropping-out behaviors. Moreover, for active students, the reform effect 
is more pronounced for students from a weak academic background than it is for stu-
dents from a strong academic background.  
The conclusion from the results controlling for intermissions is that students, espe-
cially those from a strong academic background, on average, tend to have fewer inter-
missions (semesters with zero credit points achieved) after the reform than before the 
reform. This result fits nicely with the interpretation that individuals tend to reallocate 
time from work to studies so as to graduate faster. Another interpretation, related to the 
stricter repayment schedule of the student loans, is that students drop-out to a lesser de-
gree since i) they have to start the repayment of their loans as they do or ii) they have   17 
greater incentive to attain a degree because it will increase their chances of obtaining a 
job and an income, thus allowing them to have the necessary means to repay their loans.  
Intermission and drop-out behavior is a part of the individual study efficiency, our 
outcome of interest; therefore, we will not control for intermissions in our main analys-
es. We will, however,  present the results including intermissions in the Appendix.  
Moreover, we will, for the remainder of the paper, present the results including the inte-
raction variables between parental educational level and the reform. Hence, we focus on 
Specification 7 in Table 1 from here on.   
Table 1. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester. OLS. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
r  -0.288***  0.490***  0.226***  0.097***  0.085***  0.032***  -0.013**  -0.058*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
ONE*r              0.044***  0.008 
              (0.008)  (0.005) 
BOTH*r              0.126***  0.027*** 
              (0.008)  (0.005) 
  Study progression va-
riables 
             
Number of semesters 
since enrollment 
               
S_2    -0.021***  -0.473***  -0.447***  -0.446***  -0.666***  -0.666***  -0.265*** 
    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
S_3    -0.193***  -0.992***  -0.937***  -0.928***  -1.276***  -1.275***  -0.524*** 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
S_4    -0.320***  -1.432***  -1.358***  -1.344***  -1.774***  -1.772***  -0.779*** 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
S_5    -0.500***  -1.864***  -1.765***  -1.745***  -2.197***  -2.195***  -0.963*** 
    (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
S_6    -0.663***  -2.189***  -2.077***  -2.053***  -2.453***  -2.450***  -1.112*** 
    (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
S_7    -0.937***  -2.532***  -2.404***  -2.375***  -2.720***  -2.718***  -1.032*** 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
S_8    -1.541***  -3.008***  -2.864***  -2.833***  -3.101***  -3.099***  -1.319*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
S_9    -1.638***  -3.091***  -2.928***  -2.888***  -3.116***  -3.113***  -1.209*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
S_10    -2.146***  -3.489***  -3.312***  -3.267***  -3.446***  -3.442***  -1.464*** 
    (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
S_11    -2.075***  -3.431***  -3.244***  -3.189***  -3.335***  -3.330***  -1.278*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
S_12    -2.520***  -3.781***  -3.580***  -3.521***  -3.628***  -3.622***  -1.542*** 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Fall    -0.555***  -0.434***  -0.422***  -0.425***  -0.414***  -0.414***  -0.440*** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Cumulative credit 
points 
               
cum_p      0.036***  0.035***  0.035***  0.056***  0.056***  0.032*** 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
cum_p^2      -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Cohorts               
C_1996        0.099***  0.111***       
        (0.006)  (0.006)       
C_1997        0.155***  0.174***       
        (0.005)  (0.005)       
C_1998        0.303***  0.325***       
        (0.005)  (0.005)       18   
C_1999        0.340***  0.377***       
        (0.005)  (0.005)       
C_2000        0.312***  0.359***       
        (0.005)  (0.006)       
C_2001        0.204***  0.318***       
        (0.007)  (0.007)       
  Field of education               
Pedagogic          -0.027***  0.036***  0.038***  0.055*** 
          (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Humanities          -0.022***  -0.079***  -0.079***  -0.047*** 
          (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Science          0.064***  -0.115***  -0.114***  -0.031*** 
          (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Technology          0.020***  -0.105***  -0.105***  -0.063*** 
          (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Other          0.029***  -0.019  -0.018  -0.001 
          (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Healthcare          -0.030***  0.109***  0.109***  0.051*** 
          (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
Woman          -0.017***       
          (0.002)       
Immigrant          0.094***       
          (0.005)       
Age at first registration          -0.021***       
          (0.000)       
GPA          0.001***       
          (0.000)       
Have children          -0.087***  -0.259***  -0.253***  -0.071*** 
          (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Local unempl. rates          0.004***  0.034***  0.034***  0.007*** 
          (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  Parental educational 
level (university educ.) 
             
ONE          0.020***       
          (0.002)       
BOTH          0.054***       
          (0.002)       
                 
Individual FE  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 
Intermission                -1.720*** 
                (0.004) 
Constant  2.004***  2.698***  2.219***  1.948***  2.287***  1.631***  1.631***  2.170*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
                 
Observations  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649  1,135,649 
R-squared  0.011  0.255  0.482  0.486  0.491  0.299  0.299  0.542 
ll  -1.965e+06  -1.804e+06  -1.598e+06  -1.594e+06  -1.588e+06  -1.474e+06  -1.474e+06  -1.233e+06 
Number of id.  122,372  122,372  122,372  122,372  122,372  122,372  122,372  122,372 
Note: Robust standard deviations are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
 
5.2  Students with Different Amounts of Student Aid  
In this section, we divide students into two groups depending on their average amount 
of student aid during the first two years of studies (before the reform for most cohorts): 
i) students with student aid corresponding to the maximum amount of student aid for 
full-year students (loans and grants)
23
                                                 
23 That is, full-time students who are enrolled for the full-academic year.  
 and ii) students with student aid corresponding to   19 
the amount of student aid for full-year students with only grants.
24
4
 Hence, our intention 
is to identify full-year students and to divide them into two groups – one group of stu-
dents with grants and maximum loans and one group with only grants. Students with 
loans are affected by the changes in the repayment rules, whereas students with only 
grants are primarily affected by the change in the grant amount and in the allowed 
amount of earnings. However, we can only observe the total amount of student aid; that 
is, we cannot distinguish between grants and loans in the data. Therefore, we need to as-
sume that students with a total amount of student aid corresponding to full-year grants 
do not have any loans. In theory, it is possible that these students have loans that corres-
pond to full-year grants. However, as mentioned in Section  , this is not very likely.     
From Table 2, we can see that there is a significant and positive reform effect for 
students with only grants, whereas there is a significant and negative reform effect for 
students who also have the maximum amount of loans.
25
 
 Note that this is the result for 
individuals from a weak academic background. Theoretically, an increase in the grant 
level may increase study efficiency by allowing students to focus on their studies rather 
than on working, and the tighter repayment schedule of the loans may decrease study ef-
ficiency if students choose not to take loans and, instead, finance their studies by work-
ing.   
                                                 
24 See Appendix Figure A2 for the distribution of the amount of student aid. We use only the groups be-
tween the vertical lines in our estimation.  
25 For full estimates, see Appendix Table A3.The results, including control for intermissions, are dis-
played in Appendix Table A4.  20   
Table 2. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for stu-
dents with only grants and students with grants and a maximum amount of loans be-
fore the reform. OLS. 
  Only Grants  Grants and max. loans 
     
r  0.063***  -0.112*** 
  (0.019)  (0.008) 
ONE*r  0.064***  0.070*** 
  (0.024)  (0.009) 
BOTH*r  0.164***  0.152*** 
  (0.025)  (0.010) 
Constant  1.448***  1.819*** 
  (0.036)  (0.016) 
     
Controls  Yes  Yes 
     
Individual FE  Yes  Yes 
     
Observations  105,162  418,018 
R-squared  0.317  0.449 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
Ll  -134241  -476610 
Note: Controls include study progression variables, field of education, have children and local unemployment rates. 
Robust standard deviations are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. See Appendix Figure A2 for the distri-
bution of the student aid and the definition of the groups “only grants” and “grants and loans”.  
 
For individuals with a strong academic background, the estimated reform effect is 
significant and substantially positive for students with only grants and is only slightly 
positive for students with both grants and loans. In the previous section, we suggested 
that students may react to the reform by minimizing the amount of loans by allocating 
less time to work and more time to studying so as to sooner attain a degree. One expla-
nation for the different results for students with only grants compared to students with 
grants and loans could be that students with a maximum amount of loans already before 
the reform focused on their studies. Hence, they could not reallocate much more time to 
studying.  
To test the time reallocation hypotheses, we estimate the effect of the reform on indi-
vidual earnings for the two groups: students with only grants and students with grants 
and maximum loans. Note that earnings are only observed on yearly basis; hence, we 
adjust the model and estimate credit points achieved each year. We define the reform 





                                                 
26 To exclude the year 2001 from the analysis and define the reform dummy as the post-2001 period pro-
duces similar results though more positive estimates.    21 
Table 3 confirm our hypotheses that students from a weak academic background who 
have only grants earn less after the reform compared to before the reform, whereas stu-
dents with both grants and loans significantly increase their earnings after the reform.
27
An alternative hypothesis posited in Section 
 
Students from a strong academic background decrease their earnings after the reform 
compared to before, and for those students who have only grants, this decrease is even 
more substantial.  
5.1 is that the estimated reform effect 
captures some time trend in study efficiency that we have not controlled for. Controlling 
for individual FE, that is, factors such as individual preferences for loans, etc., there is 
no obvious reason that students with only grants and grants plus maximum loans should 
have different time trends. For students from a strong academic background, the esti-
mated reform effect for the sub-groups has the same sign but is very different in magni-
tude, whereas for students from a weak academic background, the estimated reform ef-
fect has opposite signs. This supports the interpretation that the reform has had a causal 
effect on individual study efficiency.   
Table 3. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for students with only grants 
and students with grants and a maximum amount of loans before the reform. OLS. 
  Only Grants  Grants and max. loans 
     
r  -0.101***  0.102*** 
  (0.035)  (0.015) 
ONE*r  -0.151***  -0.177*** 
  (0.045)  (0.019) 
BOTH*r  -0.423***  -0.401*** 
  (0.046)  (0.019) 
Constant  2.564***  2.166*** 
  (0.058)  (0.026) 
     
Controls  Yes  Yes 
     
Individual FE  Yes  Yes 
     
Observations  57,885  236,400 
R-squared  0.400  0.425 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
Ll  -92390  -355496 
Note: Controls include study progression variables, field of education, having children and local unemployment rates. 
Robust standard deviations are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. See Appendix Figure A2 for the distri-
bution of the student aid and the definition of the groups “only grants” and “grants and loans”. 
 
                                                 
27 For full estimates, see Appendix Table A5.The results, including control for intermissions, are dis-
played in Appendix Table A6.  22   
5.3  Students with Different Earnings 
In this section, we examine the reform effect for students with different earnings before 
the reform. As with the student aid, we use the average earnings over the first two years 
of the study spell.
28 In particular, we are interested in determining if the reform effect 
differs between students who earn less than and more than the allowed amount before 
the reform. Students who earn more than the allowed amount before the reform are 
probably not as affected by the changes imposed by the reform as students who earned 
less than the allowed amount, which was possibly restricted by the rules in the former 
system. Overall, this analysis corresponds to the analysis in the previous section; stu-
dents with only grants may earn more than the allowed amount, whereas students with 
grants and maximum student loans, by definition, earn less. The allowed amount before 
the reform was approximately 55,000 SEK (approximately 5,500 EUR).
29
The results in 
 
Table 4 reveal that, for students from a weak academic background, 
the study efficiency has decreased for students who, before the reform, earned less than 
55,000 SEK, whereas the study efficiency seems to have increased slightly for students 
who earned more than the allowed amount. This result is consistent with the results in 
the previous section.
30
                                                 
28See Appendix Figure A3 for the distribution of earnings. 
 The corresponding result holds for individuals from a strong 
academic background. That is, individuals who earned more than the allowed amount 
increased their study efficiency more compared to students who earned less than the al-
lowed amount.  
29 This corresponds to 1.5 basic amounts. In 2001, one basic amount corresponded to 36,900 SEK. 
30 For full estimates, see Appendix Table A7. The results, including control for intermissions, are dis-
played in Appendix Table A8.    23 
Table 4. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for stu-
dents with different earnings (E) before the reform (in basic amounts). OLS. 
  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.009  -0.049***  -0.038***  0.029*  0.026 
  (0.030)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
ONE*r  0.071*  0.071***  0.052***  0.039*  0.039 
  (0.040)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.028) 
BOTH*r  0.180***  0.161***  0.173***  0.133***  0.167*** 
  (0.041)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.035) 
Constant  1.628***  1.687***  1.714***  1.695***  1.453*** 
  (0.056)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.039) 
           
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  39,547  603,467  204,092  161,069  88,768 
R-squared  0.291  0.313  0.333  0.310  0.319 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
Ll  -51381  -773975  -261776  -211841  -114028 
Note: Controls include study progression variables, field of education, having children and local unemployment rates. 
Robust standard deviations are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. See the Appendix Figure A3 for the dis-
tribution of earnings and the definition of the thresholds. The thresholds are based on basic amounts (1, 1.5 and 2.5).   
 
As in the previous section, we investigate whether the heterogeneous results may be 
linked to the reallocation of time between working and studying; hence, we specifically 
investigate how individual earnings are affected by the reform for students who earned 
less than and more than the allowed amount. Again, as in the previous section, we ad-
just the model to yearly data. From Table 5, it is obvious that individuals from a weak 
academic background who earned less than 55,000 SEK before the reform have in-
creased their earnings, whereas there is a negative and significant effect for individuals 
who earned more than 55,000 SEK. Individuals from a strong academic background 
have decreased their earnings, and more so for those who earned less than 55,000 SEK 
before the reform.
31
                                                 
31 For full estimates, see Appendix Table A9.The results including control for intermissions are displayed 
in Appendix Table A10.  
 The results confirm the findings from the previous section and, 
hence, strengthen the hypothesis that individuals tend to reallocate time from studying 
to working as a consequence of the reform.  24   
Table 5. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for students with different 
earnings (E) before the reform (in basic amounts). OLS. 
  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.079  0.046***  0.087***  -0.066**  0.043 
  (0.051)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.046) 
ONE*r  -0.061  -0.195***  -0.226***  -0.126***  0.067 
  (0.066)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.067) 
BOTH*r  -0.372***  -0.440***  -0.497***  -0.289***  -0.229*** 
  (0.058)  (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.084) 
Constant  1.137***  1.721***  2.798***  3.563***  4.679*** 
  (0.091)  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.049)  (0.086) 
           
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
Observations  21,296  333,650  112,714  87,450  46,038 
R-squared  0.358  0.406  0.369  0.306  0.240 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
Ll  -31038  -501468  -184793  -155197  -93881 
Note: Controls include study progression variables, field of education, having children and local unemployment rates. 
Robust standard deviations are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. See the Appendix Figure A3 for the dis-
tribution of earnings and the definition of the thresholds. The thresholds are based on basic amounts (1, 1.5 and 2.5). 
5.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the robustness of our results, we have preformed a number of sensitivity analys-
es. The results are presented in Table A11 of the Appendix. We have, in our baseline 
specification (Specification 7 in Table 1), i) included students with missing information 
on their parental education in the NONE category (students for whom neither parent has 
a university education),ii) imposed a tighter age-restriction so as to focus on a more 
homogenous sample, and iii) exchanged the continuous variables for total credit points 
achieved (cum_p and cum_p
2) with dummy variables to test the functional form of our 
model. The results are robust to these sensitivity checks.  
Throughout, we have presented all results, including a dummy variable for semesters 
with zero credit points achieved, that is, the results for active students, in the Appendix. 
However, until now, we have not commented on these results. Overall, the pattern is 
very similar to the results presented in the paper, including intermissions in the out-
come, but as we also noted in Section 5.1, the parameter estimates are, overall, less pos-
itive/more negative. In general, we find no positive results on study efficiency for stu-
dents from a strong academic background. Hence, the positive reform effect for students 
from a strong academic background appears to be completely driven by their intermis-
sion and drop-out behavior.      25 
6  Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the effect of a significant reform in student aid on individual study 
efficiency measured by the number of credit points obtained each semester. Though the 
total amount of student aid was unaffected, the reform incorporated three major 
changes: i) the grant-share of the total aid increased, ii) students were allowed to earn 
more without a reduction in their student aid, and iii) the rules of the repayment of the 
loans were significantly tightened. Moreover, the reform incorporated a few minor 
changes including the following: the maximum number of years with student aid is, as 
before the reform, 6 years, but the possibility for an extension is considerably reduced; 
the maximum age of eligibility is 50 years, compared to 45 before the reform; and stu-
dents with children are allowed higher student loans than students without children. 
Theoretically, the expected effect of the reform is unclear.  
We find a slightly positive and significant reform effect on the aggregate level, but 
when dividing the sample conditionally on the student’s parental educational level, we 
find that the study efficiency has increased only for students from a strong academic 
background. Hence, the time-to-graduation has decreased for this group of students, and 
consequently, the relative time-to-graduation has increased for students from a weak 
academic background.  
Long study durations, as mentioned, not only create considerable social costs but also 
create costs at the individual level. One of the overall objectives of the student aid sys-
tem is to reduce the cost of higher education for individuals with a weak academic 
background. However, relative to individuals from a strong academic background, the 
reform appears to have increased the cost in terms of relatively longer study duration of 
higher education for individuals from a weak academic background, even though the 
system of student aid after the reform may, to a higher degree, bear its own costs.  
We pose two main hypotheses to explain our result. First, we suggest that students 
want to minimize the amount of loans as a consequence of the reform and possibly do 
so by reallocating time from working to studying so as to sooner attain their degree. 
However, students from a weak academic background may not have the option to real-
locate time from working to studying. Second, we pose the hypothesis that students 
from a strong academic background are less dependent on the student aid system and 26   
therefore are less sensitive to changes in the system. Hence, the estimated reform effect 
may capture some time trend, and students from a weak academic background would 
have had the same time trend in absence of the reform. However, students with different 
academic backgrounds may simply have different time trends. To test these hypotheses 
and to further examine the effect of different aspects of the reform, we perform analyses 
for some sub-samples.  
We divide the students into sub-groups based on the amount of student aid and earn-
ings before the reform. We posit that if our estimated reform effect captures some time 
trend, the effect should be similar between sub-groups of students with the same paren-
tal background. Note that we control for individual FE and, i.e., factors such as individ-
ual preferences for loans among other factors. For students from a strong academic 
background, the estimated reform effect has the same sign but is very different in mag-
nitude for students who have only grants before the reform compared to students with 
both grants and loans. For students from a weak academic background the estimated 
reform effect has opposite signs for the two groups. This strengthens the interpretation 
that the reform has had a causal effect on individual study efficiency.  
The sub-sample analysis further reveals that for individuals from a weak academic 
background, students who have only grants (and who may earn more than the allowed 
amount) increase their study efficiency, whereas students who have both grants and 
loans (and who earn less than the allowed amount) decrease their study efficiency. The 
corresponding pattern holds for students from a strong academic background; individu-
als with only grants increase their study efficiency substantially more compared to stu-
dents with both grants and loans. Theoretically, an increase in the grant level may in-
crease study efficiency by allowing students to focus on their studies instead of e.g. 
working, and the tighter repayment schedule of the loans may decrease study efficiency 
if students choose not to take loans and to finance their studies by working instead. For 
students from a strong academic background, however, students who have both grants 
and loans increased their study efficiency, though not as much as students with only 
grants; students with both grants and loans may already, before the reform, focus on 
their studies and thus do not reallocate more time to studies. Moreover, the different re-
sults for students from strong and weak academic backgrounds seem to be related to the   27 
reallocation of time between working and studying. That is, students from a strong aca-
demic background earn less after the reform compared to before, whereas students from 
a weak academic background, on average, earn slightly more. Students from a weak 
academic background are plausibly more dependent on financing their studies by work 
and accordingly, may not have the option to reallocate time from work to studies; ra-
ther, they seem to allocate more time to work.   
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Table A1. Variable list. 
Variables  Description 
r  = 1 after the reform, i.e., fall 2001 - . 
S_1 – S_12  Dummy variables for each semester from registration. 
Fall  =1 if fall semester. 
Cum_p  The total number of credit points acquired.  
Cum_p
2  ‘’                                                                (squared).  
C_1995  = 1 if the student has a first registration in a program in 1995. 
C_1996  ‘’                                                                                    1996. 
C_1997  ‘’                                                                                     1997. 
C_1998  ‘’                                                                                     1998. 
C_1999  ‘’                                                                                     1999. 
C_2000  ‘’                                                                                     2000. 
C_2001  ‘’                                                                                     2001. 
Unemployment  Youth unemployment rate at the university location. 
Social science  =1 if the dominating field of education is social science. 
Pedagogics  =1                             ”                                 pedagogics. 
Humanities  =1                             ”                                 humanities. 
Science  =1                             ”                                 science. 
Technology  =1                             ”                                 technology. 
Health Care  =1                             ”                                 health care 
Other  = 1                             “                                agriculture,  services or ”other” 
Woman  =1 woman 
Parent  =1 if the student has children. 
Immigrant  = 1 if born outside Sweden 
Age at first reg.  The student’s age at first registration 
NONE  = 1 if neither parent has a university education  
ONE  = 1 if one parent has a university education 
BOTH  = 1 if both parents have a university education. 
MISSING  = 1 if parental information is missing from one or both parents. 
GPA  Grade point average (GPA) from high school. 
WORK  Work related earnings. 
STUD  Student aid income.  
Intermissions  Indicates semesters with zero credit points achieved. 32   
Table A2. Means and standard deviations of the variables used. Different samples.  
Variable  Full  BOTH  ONE  NONE  OG  FT  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  92’<E 
C_1995  0,05  0,04  0,05  0,06  0,08  0,04  0,08  0,06  0,05  0,04  0,04 
C_1996  0,07  0,05  0,06  0,07  0,07  0,05  0,10  0,07  0,06  0,06  0,08 
C_1997  0,10  0,10  0,10  0,10  0,10  0,07  0,13  0,10  0,09  0,09  0,13 
C_1998  0,18  0,19  0,18  0,17  0,18  0,17  0,19  0,20  0,17  0,15  0,17 
C_1999  0,28  0,28  0,28  0,27  0,30  0,33  0,24  0,29  0,30  0,28  0,26 
C_2000  0,30  0,30  0,30  0,29  0,27  0,36  0,26  0,28  0,34  0,37  0,33 
C_2001  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Unemployment  8,78  8,06  8,76  9,22  8,74  8,60  9,76  9,02  8,62  8,39  8,65 
  (3,74)  (3,46)  (3,74)  (3,83)  (4,04)  (3,48)  (4,03)  (3,77)  (3,70)  (3,64)  (3,82) 
Pedagogics  0,02  0,01  0,02  0,03  0,03  0,02  0,01  0,02  0,02  0,03  0,03 
Humanities  0,08  0,08  0,08  0,08  0,06  0,08  0,08  0,08  0,07  0,07  0,08 
Social Science  0,26  0,27  0,26  0,25  0,22  0,27  0,21  0,24  0,27  0,28  0,26 
Science  0,18  0,21  0,18  0,16  0,17  0,17  0,27  0,20  0,15  0,15  0,14 
Technology  0,22  0,22  0,23  0,22  0,28  0,21  0,26  0,24  0,22  0,21  0,24 
Other  0,02  0,01  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,01  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,02 
Health  0,16  0,14  0,15  0,18  0,17  0,17  0,09  0,14  0,18  0,17  0,14 
Woman  0,52  0,48  0,51  0,55  0,52  0,56  0,36  0,52  0,56  0,50  0,39 
Parent  0,09  0,04  0,07  0,12  0,04  0,08  0,14  0,07  0,08  0,10  0,17 
Immigrant  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,03  0,04  0,11  0,04  0,03  0,03  0,03 
Age at first reg.  22,01  21,16  21,78  22,66  20,84  22,26  22,48  21,41  22,09  22,76  23,89 
  (3,17)  (2,32)  (2,96)  (3,58)  (2,39)  (3,13)  (3,74)  (2,80)  (3,02)  (3,34)  (3,84) 
NONE  0,44  0,00  0,00  1,00  0,43  0,45  0,46  0,40  0,47  0,50  0,55 
ONE  0,30  0,00  1,00  0,00  0,31  0,30  0,29  0,30  0,30  0,31  0,29 
BOTH  0,25  1,00  0,00  0,00  0,26  0,25  0,26  0,29  0,23  0,19  0,16 
GPA  14,27  15,04  14,20  13,87  14,81  14,24  13,81  14,50  14,22  13,93  13,56 
  (2,38)  (2,45)  (2,36)  (2,24)  (2,33)  (2,34)  (2,47)  (2,40)  (2,30)  (2,30)  (2,25) 
WORK  38478  32767  38276  41905  35634  30385  0  19285  44490  68507  130816 
  (34945)  (29560)  (33801)  (38007)  (31552)  (20416)    (9967)  (5238)  (10040)  (46057) 
STUD  42521  43165  42491  42170  16839  58242  40079  45240  44325  38183  20555 
  (19687)  (19121)  (19594)  (20059)  (1076)  (3571)  (20762)  (18535)  (18167)  (19095)  (17265) 
Intermission  0,13  0,12  0,13  0,14  0,10  0,03  0,13  0,09  0,11  0,19  0,42 
# of Individuals  122372  31153  37102  54117  11521  49484  4032  66323  22443  16766  8126 
Note: We only include students registered during spring 2001. The definition of fields of education is based on the field in which the student acquires the most 
credit points. Note that teachers can be found within all fields, which explains the low share of students within pedagogics. Incomes are displayed in SEK in 
prices from 2001(100 SEK is approximately 10 EUR).   33 
Table A3. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for stu-
dents with only grants and students with grants and a maximum amount of student 
loans before the reform. OLS with individual FE. 
  Only grants  Grants and loans 
     
r  0.063***  -0.112*** 
  (0.019)  (0.008) 
ONE*r  0.064***  0.070*** 
  (0.024)  (0.009) 
BOTH*r  0.164***  0.152*** 
  (0.025)  (0.010) 
S_2  -0.660***  -0.787*** 
  (0.016)  (0.011) 
S_3  -1.235***  -1.553*** 
  (0.021)  (0.018) 
S_4  -1.620***  -2.298*** 
  (0.029)  (0.026) 
S_5  -1.925***  -3.048*** 
  (0.033)  (0.032) 
S_6  -2.074***  -3.606*** 
  (0.038)  (0.038) 
S_7  -2.514***  -4.281*** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) 
S_8  -2.986***  -4.880*** 
  (0.045)  (0.043) 
S_9  -2.992***  -4.969*** 
  (0.047)  (0.044) 
S_10  -3.335***  -5.351*** 
  (0.049)  (0.045) 
S_11  -3.215***  -5.235*** 
  (0.050)  (0.046) 
S_12  -3.510***  -5.524*** 
  (0.052)  (0.046) 
S_Fall  -0.414***  -0.385*** 
  (0.009)  (0.004) 
cum_p  0.057***  0.060*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.050  0.053*** 
  (0.035)  (0.012) 
Humanities  -0.055*  -0.041*** 
  (0.029)  (0.009) 
Science  -0.104***  -0.053*** 
  (0.023)  (0.008) 
Technology  -0.097***  -0.019** 
  (0.025)  (0.009) 
Other  -0.020  0.039*** 
  (0.037)  (0.014) 
Healthcare  0.050  0.035** 
  (0.044)  (0.015) 
Have children  -0.125***  -0.213*** 
  (0.041)  (0.017) 
Local unempl. rates  0.050***  0.020*** 
  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Constant  1.448***  1.819*** 
  (0.036)  (0.016) 
     
Observations  105,162  418,018 
R-squared  0.317  0.449 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
ll  -134241  -476610 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, p<0.001***. 
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Table A4. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for stu-
dents with only grants and students with grants and a maximum amount of student 
loans before the reform, including control for intermissions. OLS with individual FE. 
  Only grants  Grants and loans 
     
r  -0.017  -0.116*** 
  (0.012)  (0.006) 
ONE*r  0.002  0.030*** 
  (0.015)  (0.007) 
BOTH*r  0.045***  0.065*** 
  (0.016)  (0.007) 
S_2  -0.274***  -0.671*** 
  (0.014)  (0.010) 
S_3  -0.529***  -1.270*** 
  (0.018)  (0.016) 
S_4  -0.730***  -1.851*** 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
S_5  -0.884***  -2.365*** 
  (0.027)  (0.029) 
S_6  -0.945***  -2.710*** 
  (0.031)  (0.034) 
S_7  -0.883***  -2.867*** 
  (0.034)  (0.038) 
S_8  -1.232***  -3.304*** 
  (0.037)  (0.040) 
S_9  -1.140***  -3.239*** 
  (0.038)  (0.041) 
S_10  -1.397***  -3.550*** 
  (0.040)  (0.042) 
S_11  -1.208***  -3.355*** 
  (0.039)  (0.043) 
S_12  -1.470***  -3.640*** 
  (0.041)  (0.043) 
S_Fall  -0.430***  -0.428*** 
  (0.009)  (0.004) 
cum_p  0.034***  0.053*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.044**  0.065*** 
  (0.021)  (0.009) 
Humanities  -0.047***  -0.028*** 
  (0.018)  (0.007) 
Science  -0.010  -0.013** 
  (0.014)  (0.006) 
Technology  -0.057***  -0.015** 
  (0.016)  (0.007) 
Other  0.012  0.039*** 
  (0.024)  (0.011) 
Healthcare  0.044*  0.026** 
  (0.023)  (0.010) 
Have children  -0.011  -0.056*** 
  (0.026)  (0.013) 
Local unempl. rates  0.011***  0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Intermissions  -1.769***  -1.521*** 
  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Constant  2.111***  2.091*** 
  (0.025)  (0.013) 
     
Observations  105,162  418,018 
R-squared  0.555  0.576 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
ll  -111728  -422009 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, p<0.001**.   35 
Table A5. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for students with only grants 
and students with grants and a maximum amount of student loans before the reform, 
OLS with individual FE. 
  Only grants  Grants and loans 
     
r  -0.101***  0.102*** 
  (0.035)  (0.015) 
ONE*r  -0.151***  -0.177*** 
  (0.045)  (0.019) 
BOTH*r  -0.423***  -0.401*** 
  (0.046)  (0.019) 
Y_2  0.304***  -0.108*** 
  (0.024)  (0.015) 
Y_3  1.014***  0.551*** 
  (0.046)  (0.030) 
Y_4  1.911***  1.803*** 
  (0.060)  (0.040) 
Y_5  3.062***  3.182*** 
  (0.069)  (0.046) 
Y_6  3.839***  4.149*** 
  (0.077)  (0.049) 
cum_p  -0.033***  -0.015*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.123**  0.127*** 
  (0.053)  (0.020) 
Humanities  -0.012  0.032** 
  (0.043)  (0.016) 
Science  0.104***  0.107*** 
  (0.037)  (0.015) 
Technology  -0.035  -0.090*** 
  (0.042)  (0.019) 
Other  0.125*  -0.018 
  (0.065)  (0.024) 
Healthcare  -0.074  0.036 
  (0.060)  (0.025) 
Have children  -1.426***  -0.922*** 
  (0.090)  (0.040) 
Local unempl. rates  -0.115***  -0.088*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Constant  2.564***  2.166*** 
  (0.058)  (0.026) 
     
Observations  57,885  236,400 
R-squared  0.400  0.425 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
ll  -92390  -355496 
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Table A6. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for students with only grants 
and students with grants and a maximum amount of student loans before the reform, 
including control for intermissions.OLS with individual FE. 
  Only grants  Grants and loans 
     
r  -0.044  0.073*** 
  (0.030)  (0.013) 
ONE*r  -0.082**  -0.119*** 
  (0.039)  (0.017) 
BOTH*r  -0.295***  -0.289*** 
  (0.040)  (0.017) 
Y_2  -0.240***  -0.411*** 
  (0.023)  (0.014) 
Y_3  -0.168***  -0.271*** 
  (0.045)  (0.028) 
Y_4  0.340***  0.315*** 
  (0.059)  (0.039) 
Y_5  0.828***  0.866*** 
  (0.071)  (0.045) 
Y_6  1.383***  1.525*** 
  (0.078)  (0.049) 
cum_p  -0.004***  -0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.108**  0.107*** 
  (0.046)  (0.018) 
Humanities  -0.027  0.013 
  (0.037)  (0.015) 
Science  0.026  0.066*** 
  (0.032)  (0.014) 
Technology  -0.053  -0.067*** 
  (0.036)  (0.017) 
Other  0.097*  -0.008 
  (0.055)  (0.022) 
Healthcare  -0.031  0.062*** 
  (0.047)  (0.021) 
Have children  -1.600***  -1.150*** 
  (0.086)  (0.039) 
Local unempl. rates  -0.082***  -0.074*** 
  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Intermissions  1.966***  1.995*** 
  (0.029)  (0.017) 
Constant  1.930***  1.884*** 
  (0.051)  (0.023) 
     
Observations  57,885  236,400 
R-squared  0.509  0.511 
Number of id.  11,521  49,484 
ll  -86579  -336376 
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Table A7. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for in-
dividuals with different earnings (E) before the reform. OLS with individual FE. 
VARIABLES  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.009  -0.049***  -0.038***  0.029*  0.026 
  (0.030)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
ONE*r  0.071*  0.071***  0.052***  0.039*  0.039 
  (0.040)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.028) 
BOTH*r  0.180***  0.161***  0.173***  0.133***  0.167*** 
  (0.041)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.035) 
S_2  -0.621***  -0.688***  -0.696***  -0.738***  -0.751*** 
  (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
S_3  -1.189***  -1.311***  -1.342***  -1.449***  -1.569*** 
  (0.031)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
S_4  -1.640***  -1.852***  -1.890***  -1.942***  -1.972*** 
  (0.042)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
S_5  -1.967***  -2.358***  -2.455***  -2.380***  -2.083*** 
  (0.047)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
S_6  -2.259***  -2.679***  -2.737***  -2.532***  -2.177*** 
  (0.053)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
S_7  -2.585***  -3.035***  -3.072***  -2.788***  -2.251*** 
  (0.058)  (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
S_8  -2.948***  -3.462***  -3.484***  -3.090***  -2.422*** 
  (0.064)  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
S_9  -3.017***  -3.505***  -3.524***  -3.104***  -2.426*** 
  (0.066)  (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.029) 
S_10  -3.386***  -3.877***  -3.851***  -3.393***  -2.569*** 
  (0.069)  (0.023)  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
S_11  -3.288***  -3.778***  -3.740***  -3.277***  -2.508*** 
  (0.071)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
S_12  -3.570***  -4.106***  -4.020***  -3.540***  -2.645*** 
  (0.074)  (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
S_Fall  -0.385***  -0.407***  -0.412***  -0.389***  -0.275*** 
  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
cum_p  0.058***  0.058***  0.057***  0.061***  0.065*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.061  0.048***  0.053**  0.028  0.021 
  (0.081)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.047) 
Humanities  -0.081*  -0.068***  -0.081***  -0.115***  -0.100*** 
  (0.042)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.037) 
Science  -0.064*  -0.100***  -0.116***  -0.165***  -0.187*** 
  (0.036)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.032) 
Technology  -0.059  -0.086***  -0.112***  -0.167***  -0.243*** 
  (0.040)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.037) 
Other  -0.042  -0.009  -0.027  -0.048  -0.066 
  (0.083)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.062) 
Healthcare  0.102  0.097***  0.097***  0.152***  0.205*** 
  (0.076)  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.052) 
Have children  -0.360***  -0.309***  -0.342***  -0.336***  -0.237*** 
  (0.066)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Local unempl. rates  0.026***  0.029***  0.029***  0.023***  0.021*** 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Constant  1.628***  1.687***  1.714***  1.695***  1.453*** 
  (0.056)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.039) 
           
Observations  39,547  603,467  204,092  161,069  88,768 
R-squared  0.291  0.313  0.333  0.310  0.319 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
ll  -51381  -773975  -261776  -211841  -114028 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, p<0.001**. 
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Table A8. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved each semester for in-
dividuals with different earnings (E) before the reform, including intermissions. OLS 
with individual FE. 
VARIABLES  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.031  -0.080***  -0.081***  -0.055***  -0.033*** 
  (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
ONE*r  0.042  0.021***  0.011  0.006  0.022 
  (0.027)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
BOTH*r  0.075***  0.052***  0.049***  0.024*  0.073*** 
  (0.028)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
S_2  -0.250***  -0.361***  -0.328***  -0.183***  -0.016 
  (0.023)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.016) 
S_3  -0.520***  -0.692***  -0.636***  -0.428***  -0.228*** 
  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
S_4  -0.757***  -1.009***  -0.927***  -0.593***  -0.354*** 
  (0.037)  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
S_5  -0.912***  -1.270***  -1.174***  -0.772***  -0.398*** 
  (0.041)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
S_6  -1.088***  -1.453***  -1.329***  -0.837***  -0.436*** 
  (0.047)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
S_7  -1.144***  -1.434***  -1.259***  -0.789***  -0.406*** 
  (0.050)  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
S_8  -1.376***  -1.745***  -1.578***  -0.999***  -0.497*** 
  (0.055)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
S_9  -1.314***  -1.647***  -1.483***  -0.895***  -0.467*** 
  (0.056)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
S_10  -1.585***  -1.927***  -1.750***  -1.124***  -0.555*** 
  (0.059)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
S_11  -1.433***  -1.744***  -1.543***  -0.939***  -0.479*** 
  (0.059)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
S_12  -1.670***  -2.031***  -1.818***  -1.178***  -0.586*** 
  (0.062)  (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
S_Fall  -0.394***  -0.434***  -0.456***  -0.404***  -0.264*** 
  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
cum_p  0.034***  0.038***  0.035***  0.029***  0.028*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
cum_p
2  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  0.047  0.063***  0.068***  0.029*  0.066** 
  (0.049)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.028) 
Humanities  -0.041  -0.041***  -0.042***  -0.064***  -0.073*** 
  (0.029)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.023) 
Science  -0.013  -0.026***  -0.024**  -0.064***  -0.051*** 
  (0.025)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.018) 
Technology  -0.038  -0.055***  -0.061***  -0.096***  -0.109*** 
  (0.028)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Other  -0.035  0.007  -0.002  -0.014  -0.008 
  (0.056)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.035) 
Healthcare  0.041  0.048***  0.054***  0.069***  0.093*** 
  (0.047)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.026) 
Have children  -0.167***  -0.089***  -0.105***  -0.098***  -0.097*** 
  (0.045)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Local unempl. rates  0.008***  0.007***  0.003***  0.001  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Intermissions  -1.533***  -1.659***  -1.730***  -1.827***  -1.783*** 
  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Constant  2.031***  2.140***  2.238***  2.233***  1.910*** 
  (0.041)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.024) 
           
Observations  39,547  603,467  204,092  161,069  88,768 
R-squared  0.497  0.527  0.563  0.589  0.608 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
ll  -44597  -661692  -218681  -170070  -89462 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, p<0.001**.   39 
Table A9. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for individuals with different 
earnings (E) before the reform.OLS with individual FE. 
           
VARIABLES  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.079  0.046***  0.087***  -0.066**  0.043 
  (0.051)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.046) 
ONE*r  -0.061  -0.195***  -0.226***  -0.126***  0.067 
  (0.066)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.067) 
BOTH*r  -0.372***  -0.440***  -0.497***  -0.289***  -0.229*** 
  (0.058)  (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.084) 
Y_2  0.064***  0.078***  0.059***  0.280***  1.289*** 
  (0.024)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.032) 
Y_3  0.207***  0.626***  1.060***  1.704***  2.794*** 
  (0.052)  (0.017)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.049) 
Y_4  0.748***  1.571***  2.238***  2.715***  3.059*** 
  (0.074)  (0.024)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.057) 
Y_5  1.566***  2.620***  3.302***  3.623***  3.499*** 
  (0.092)  (0.028)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.064) 
Y_6  2.300***  3.464***  4.035***  4.235***  3.865*** 
  (0.103)  (0.031)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.069) 
cum_p  -0.016***  -0.019***  -0.032***  -0.053***  -0.070*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
cum_p
2  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  -0.038  0.128***  0.143***  0.165***  -0.192 
  (0.091)  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.147) 
Humanities  0.030  0.041***  0.075***  0.117***  0.018 
  (0.052)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.038)  (0.078) 
Science  0.104**  0.125***  0.147***  0.084**  0.169*** 
  (0.052)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.065) 
Technology  0.108*  -0.002  -0.012  -0.013  -0.041 
  (0.060)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.040)  (0.077) 
Other  -0.018  0.047**  0.050  0.056  -0.129 
  (0.109)  (0.023)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.126) 
Healthcare  0.074  -0.043*  -0.073*  -0.119**  -0.380*** 
  (0.093)  (0.022)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.090) 
Have children  0.084  -0.750***  -1.185***  -1.232***  -1.168*** 
  (0.124)  (0.033)  (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.073) 
Local unempl. rates  -0.088***  -0.087***  -0.100***  -0.096***  -0.108*** 
  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Constant  1.137***  1.721***  2.798***  3.563***  4.679*** 
  (0.091)  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.049)  (0.086) 
           
Observations  21,296  333,650  112,714  87,450  46,038 
R-squared  0.358  0.406  0.369  0.306  0.240 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
ll  -31038  -501468  -184793  -155197  -93881 
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Table A10. The estimated reform effect on annual earnings for individuals with different 
earnings (E) before the reform, including intermissions. OLS with individual FE. 
VARIABLES  E=0  0<E<37’  37’<E<55’  55’<E<92’  E>92’ 
           
r  -0.069  0.051***  0.103***  0.001  0.096** 
  (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.043) 
ONE*r  -0.027  -0.143***  -0.173***  -0.088***  0.065 
  (0.062)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.060) 
BOTH*r  -0.320***  -0.345***  -0.362***  -0.180***  -0.133* 
  (0.055)  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.038)  (0.076) 
Y_2  -0.239***  -0.319***  -0.493***  -0.457***  0.321*** 
  (0.028)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.036) 
Y_3  -0.469***  -0.298***  -0.212***  0.036  0.801*** 
  (0.060)  (0.018)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
Y_4  -0.161*  0.216***  0.347***  0.547***  0.851*** 
  (0.082)  (0.024)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.067) 
Y_5  0.374***  0.807***  0.891***  1.011***  1.073*** 
  (0.098)  (0.029)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.074) 
Y_6  0.942***  1.425***  1.397***  1.417***  1.324*** 
  (0.109)  (0.032)  (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.079) 
cum_p  0.000  0.002***  -0.004***  -0.016***  -0.026*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
cum_p
2  0.000***  0.000**  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pedagogic  -0.052  0.111***  0.108***  0.122***  -0.244* 
  (0.083)  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.141) 
Humanities  -0.001  0.015  0.046*  0.069**  -0.011 
  (0.049)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.072) 
Science  0.070  0.068***  0.053**  0.003  0.031 
  (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.058) 
Technology  0.104*  -0.015  -0.041  -0.049  -0.153** 
  (0.056)  (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.069) 
Other  -0.025  0.029  0.028  -0.002  -0.218* 
  (0.104)  (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.048)  (0.118) 
Healthcare  0.132  0.000  -0.008  -0.046  -0.272*** 
  (0.090)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.037)  (0.076) 
Have children  -0.049  -0.974***  -1.451***  -1.501***  -1.320*** 
  (0.121)  (0.032)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.068) 
Local unempl. rates  -0.079***  -0.072***  -0.080***  -0.078***  -0.091*** 
  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Intermissions  1.055***  1.576***  1.933***  2.058***  2.119*** 
  (0.043)  (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.037) 
Constant  0.894***  1.374***  2.342***  3.048***  4.180*** 
  (0.086)  (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.079) 
           
Observations  21,296  333,650  112,714  87,450  46,038 
R-squared  0.408  0.489  0.474  0.417  0.326 
Number of id.  4,032  66,323  22,443  16,766  8,126 
ll  -30174  -476352  -174577  -147553  -91115 
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 Table A11. Sensitivity analysis. The estimated reform effect on credit points achieved 
each semester. OLS with individual FE. 
  Baseline: Specifi-
cation 7, from Ta-
ble 1 
Including individ-




dividuals less than 
30 years of age at 
enrollment 




         
r  -0.013**  -0.004  -0.007  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
ONE*r  0.044***  0.034***  0.039***  0.055*** 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
BOTH*r  0.126***  0.117***  0.120***  0.152*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
S_2  -0.666***  -0.661***  -0.669***  -1.019*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
S_3  -1.275***  -1.271***  -1.276***  -1.621*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
S_4  -1.772***  -1.763***  -1.775***  -1.907*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
S_5  -2.195***  -2.184***  -2.200***  -2.271*** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
S_6  -2.450***  -2.434***  -2.458***  -2.499*** 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
S_7  -2.718***  -2.703***  -2.722***  -2.799*** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
S_8  -3.099***  -3.081***  -3.102***  -3.172*** 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
S_9  -3.113***  -3.095***  -3.115***  -3.193*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
S_10  -3.442***  -3.422***  -3.447***  -3.514*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
S_11  -3.330***  -3.310***  -3.335***  -3.410*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
S_12  -3.622***  -3.599***  -3.633***  -3.697*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
S_Fall  -0.414***  -0.412***  -0.414***  -0.404*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
cum_p  0.056***  0.056***  0.057***   
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
cum_p
2  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***   
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
c_2        1.388*** 
        (0.006) 
c_3        1.958*** 
        (0.008) 
c_4        2.397*** 
        (0.008) 
c_5        2.684*** 
        (0.009) 
c_6        2.954*** 
        (0.010) 
c_7        3.038*** 
        (0.011) 
c_8        3.108*** 
        (0.011) 
c_9        3.238*** 
        (0.012) 
c_10        3.394*** 
        (0.013) 
c_11        3.244*** 
        (0.013) 
c_12        3.705*** 
        (0.013) 
Pedagogic  0.038***  0.036***  0.037***  0.040*** 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Humanities  -0.079***  -0.078***  -0.081***  -0.096*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Science  -0.114***  -0.114***  -0.115***  -0.124*** 42   
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Technology  -0.105***  -0.104***  -0.104***  -0.083*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Other  -0.018  -0.025**  -0.018  -0.024** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Healthcare  0.109***  0.110***  0.111***  0.121*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Have children  -0.253***  -0.251***  -0.251***  -0.265*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Local unempl. rates  0.034***  0.034***  0.035***  0.039*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  1.631***  1.627***  1.616***  1.433*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
         
Observations  1,135,649  1,219,021  1,089,466  1,135,649 
R-squared  0.299  0.299  0.298  0.326 
Number of id.  122,372  130,933  117,251  122,372 
ll  -1.474e+06  -1.584e+06  -1.416e+06  -1.452e+06 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, p<0.001**. c_1 – c_12 are dummy va-
riables for total credit points achieved at each semester. The cumulative credit points are split into 10 cre-
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Figure A2. The mean amount of student aid during the first two years of study in SEK. 
 
Note: Incomes are displayed in SEK, in 2001 years prices (100 SEK is approximately 10 EUR). The ver-
tical lines indicate the thresholds for the sub-sample analysis. 
 
Figure A3. The mean earnings during the first two years of study in SEK. 
 
Note: Incomes are displayed in SEK, in prices from 2001(100 SEK is approximately 10 EUR). The ver-
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